7 Years since a Chinese Foreign Minister Visited Australia and New Zealand, What to Expect from Wang Yi's Visit this Time?
This is the full-text translation of a piece of analysis of Wang Yi’s visit to New Zeland and Australia featuring Chen Hong, director of the East China Normal University’s Australian Studies Centre and New Zealand Studies Centre.
Full text in Simplified Chinese can be accessed at: https://export.shobserver.com/baijiahao/html/727655.html
Translation:
In Spring 2024, China’s diplomacy is back in full force. From 17 to 21 March, Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi will pay an official visit to New Zealand and Australia. This is China’s Foreign Minister’s first visit to the two countries after seven years, and this will kick off this year’s high-level exchanges between China and the two countries.
In the meantime, analysts suggest that the aspect to pay attention to of Wang Yi’s New Zealand visit will be how China can work with the country’s new coalition government to consolidate the momentum of China-New Zealand relations. Wang Yi’s visit to Australia, on the other hand, is seen as a high point in the stabilisation of China-Australia relations in the current stage, and an important step in promoting the continued improvement of relations between the two countries.
In the meantime, observers also pointed out that, influenced by the US ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ and other factors, New Zealand’s maneuver in the space of security is worth paying attention to. In terms of China-Australia relations, the two countries’ wisdom will be tested by the methods through which they can manage their differences and promote the continued development of their comprehensive strategic partnership.
The Emergence of ‘New Variables’
Wang Yi’s visit is a diplomatic move by China towards two important countries in the South Pacific after the conclusion of China’s Two Sessions.
Both New Zealand and Australia are China’s comprehensive strategic partners. 2024 marks the 10th anniversary of President Xi’s state visit to New Zealand and Australia, and this year is also the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the China-New Zeland and China-Australia Comprehensive Partnership Agreement.
It is reported that Wang Yi’s first stop will be New Zealand, followed by the seventh round of the China-Australia Diplomatic and Strategic Dialogue with Australia’s Foreign Minister, Penny Wong, which is scheduled to be held in Australia on 20th March.
Let’s first look at Wang Yi’s visit to New Zealand.
New Zealand is an important Western developed country in the South Pacific region. Still, it has always chosen independence and autonomy as the fundamental principle of its foreign relations, creating a number of ‘firsts’ in its relations with China. It’s been called a member of the ‘Five Eyes’ who looks at China differently.
Chen Hong, director of the East China Normal University’s Australian Studies Centre and New Zealand Studies Centre stated that New Zealand’s China Policy has been showing a positive and stable outlook for a long time as both the Labour Party and the National Party attach great importance to New Zeland’s relationship with China. China-New Zealand relations have always been at the forefront of China’s relations with developed Western countries.
Taking recent years’ developments as examples, politically, China and New Zealand celebrated the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the bilateral diplomatic relations in 2022. In June 2023, the then-Prime Minister Chris Hipkins visited China. He emphasised the deep foundation of the development of bilateral relations, and he signed multiple cooperative documents with China.
Economically speaking, China is New Zealand’s largest trading partner. In 2022, the Protocol on Upgrading the China-New Zealand FTA came into force, further deepening practical cooperation between the two countries. The two countries are also deepening the mutually beneficial relationship in the negotiations on the negative list of trade in services and cooperation in RCEP…
Analyses pointed out that the basic outlook of China-New Zealand relations remains stable, but some new variables emerged that await the two countries to communicate through to ensure the healthy development of bilateral relations.
The first variable is that after the New Zealand general election in October 2023, there was a change in the country’s power structure.
The Labour Party government led by Hipkins stepped down, and was replaced by a new coalition government formed by the National Party, the Act Party and the New Zealand First Party. National Party’s leader Laxon became the new Prime Minister.
‘This is the first high-level face-to-face dialogue between China and New Zealand since the coalition party came into power’, said Chen Hong, ‘the objective of this high-level dialogue is to consolidate the positive momentum in the development of bilateral relations, and push the bilateral relations to a new height.’
New Zealand’s media pointed out that Winston Peters will be the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of New Zealand under the new government. Peters has developed a working relationship with Wang Yi during his tenure as New Zealand’s Foreign Minister between 2017 - 2020. Since becoming the Foreign Minister again, Peters has conducted a phone conversation with Wang Yi in December 2023 and expressed his willingness to continue developing China-New Zealand relations.
Mentioning Wang Yi’s visit to New Zealand, Peters said that ‘we expect to reconnect with Foreign Minister Wang Yi to comprehensively discuss our bilateral relations, this is one of New Zealand’s most important and complex bilateral relations.’
Turning towards ‘AUKUS’?
Another variable is, against the background of the US ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’, some maneuvers of New Zealand in the space of security are worth some attention.
Various signs indicate that the new three-party coalition government seems to show greater interest in participating in the second pillar of the AUKUS trilateral security partnership.
‘AUKUS’ is the first pillar and it covers cooperation in the field of nuclear, including transferring Australia with nuclear submarines and related technologies. As a country that upholds the principle of denuclearisation, New Zealand expressed its firm opposition to the first pillar of AUKUS. The second pillar focuses on emerging technologies, including cooperation such as AI and hypersonic technology.
Chen Hong said that New Zealand’s maneuvers showed the following points.
Firstly, the US wants to drag New Zealand into the ‘small circle’ to push for the development of ‘AUKUS’ and the ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’. New Zealand is pressured by the US and Australia in this regard.
Secondly, the New Zealand government might have an objective to develop domestic technology by utilising the benefits of ‘AUKUS’.
Thirdly, some conservative forces in the new government do not want to leave the outside world an ‘anti-US’ image of New Zealand.
To China, however, ‘AUKUS’ is fundamentally a military agreement to intensify military confrontation. It increases the risk of nuclear proliferation, accelerated arms race in the Asia-Pacific region and negatively impacts regional peace and stability. China and many regional countries expressed their sense of concern and opposition towards ‘AUKUS’.
Chen Hong believes that New Zealand will balance it out in relation to joining the ‘small circle’.
Chen Hong said that it is clear that it is irrational to pick a side. China-New Zealand cooperation has brought New Zealand substantial benefits and the disturbances in the China-Australia relations in recent years have also had an impact on New Zealand.
‘The outside world has noticed that New Zealand’s domestic audience did not receive New Zealand’s sign to align with ‘AUKUS’ out of the recent ‘2+2’ dialogue between Australia and New Zealand. This shows that the Luxon Government needs to consider the consequences of joining the ‘small group’, Chen Hong says.
Continue to Promote ‘Warming Up’ in the Bilateral Relations
Let’s shift our attention to Wang Yi’s visit to Australia. Chen Hong believes that Wang Yi’s visit is aimed at further promoting the improvement of bilateral relations.
Since Australia first excluded Chinese telecommunications company Huawei from the construction of its 5G network in 2018, tensions between China and Australia have escalated. In 2020, Australia also stirred up politically influenced ‘tracing of the origin’ of the COVID-19 outbreak.
Subsequently, China imposed tariffs on Australian exports such as barley, beef and wine, while also halting coal imports, leading to a freezing point in the two countries’ relationship.
Since 2022, Australia’s Labor Party adjusted its policy towards China, subsequently, China-Australia relations started to show signs of warming up. China has gradually removed its tariffs on Australian barley, coals and cotton.
This month, China stated that it would make a final decision on the issue of tariffs on Australian wine, but did not provide a clear timeline. On 16 March, Australian Prime Minister Albanese said that he was expecting China to decide to reopen its market for Australian wines in ‘the next few weeks’.
Chen Hong pointed out that the last administration in Australia blindly followed the US policy towards China, which has severely damaged China-Australia relations. After the current Australian government distanced itself from the previous government’s anti-China policies, it received a positive response from the Chinese side. Whether it was the Bali meeting of Chinese and Australian leaders in 2022 or Albanese’s visit to China last year, both have helped to bring the bilateral relationship back on track.
‘At present, China-Australia relations are stabilising and improving, basically stable, and can even be said to be developing in the direction of strengthening.’ Chen Hong said, ‘Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Australia itself is a new high point since the improvement of China-Australia relations.’
‘China and Australia do not have a mechanism for annual leadership summit. If Wang Yi’s visit goes smoothly, there may be a higher-level meeting between Chinese and Australian leaders,’ Chen Hong stated.
Mentioning the upcoming seventh round of China-Australia Diplomatic and Strategic dialogue, Chen Hong believes this mechanism has, for a long time, allowed the Foreign Ministers from the two countries to communicate face-to-face on the principled and directional issues of the bilateral relationship, seeking common ground through negotiations and managing differences.
Additionally, China and Australia may discuss some economic and financial-related topics. ‘Australia will hold an election next year. If the current government can repair the China-Australia economic and financial relations that were damaged by the previous administration, it might help itself in the upcoming election,’ Chen Hong expressed.
‘In addition, China and Australia might seek new areas, such as clean energy and green economy, to cooperate on instead of purely focusing on the traditional trade relations.’
Cannot Make the Same Mistake
Chen Hong believes that differences still exist between China and Australia despite the warming up in the bilateral relations.
In the area of security and military, the Albanese Government announced in 2024 that Australia will make a substantial investment in the next 10 years to increase the number of its surface warships to coordinate with the development of ‘AUKUS’. Australia has also coordinated military exercises with some countries in China’s vicinity, which could intensify the already tense situation in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.
In the space of economy, Australia’s actions in restricting China’s investment in Australia in the name of ‘national security’ will continue to a certain extent.
Chen Hong believes that the leaders of China and Australia will seek ways to manage differences during Wang Yi’s visit to Australia.
For Chen Hong, Australia, as a US ally, cannot align its understanding of certain things with China in a short time. ‘The two countries need to discuss how to manage differences with constructive attitudes to avoid making the same mistakes as a few years ago.’
‘The most important aspect of managing differences is the sense of caution about the ‘bottom-line issues’, such as the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, which are directly related to China’s sovereignty and integrity. These issues are not to be challenged.’
Chen Hong also expressed that Western politicians tend to view the benefits of certain decisions from the perspective of election politics, economic interests, and other short-term considerations, but in reality, it is more important to grasp bilateral relations from a long-term perspective.
Looking ahead, Chen Hong believes that the Albanese Government may politically align with the US and take advantage of the benefits that ‘AUKUS’ brings to Australia’s security and economy. However, at the same time, it will not put China-Australia relations in a disadvantageous position again. ‘The Labor Party should have a clear recognition of this. After getting out of the ‘dead end’ of the previous government, China-Australia relations cannot go back on the same path.’